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From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance




It seems obvious that regulation requires the revelation of
private information, because legal interventions can do harm
when they are designed with insufficient information about in-
dividuals' preferences and other variables. Nevertheless, aca-
demic observers and lawmakers often identify a market failure
or constituent need and then proceed to favor a specific legal in-
tervention as if its intensity were of little significance. The right
intensity, or even a level that does more good than harm, can be
difficult to determine. It is apparent that regulation is more like-
ly to improve social welfare when its intensity reflects accurate
information about the costs and benefits it generates. At the
same time, if revelation imposes emotional or other costs, then
welfare can be improved if law camouflages true preferences.
One aim of this Article is to add self-revelation to the calcu-
lus surrounding government intervention. Consequently, the fo-
cus is on internalities-that is, the class of problems in which in-
tervention might be sought to deal with problems of self-control,
broadly defined. Internality- driven interventions expose the
need for one kind of information revelation because the essence
of the interventionist claim is that the present self seeks to con-
strain the future self. But how do we evaluate the costs imposed
on the future self and how do we assess the benefits to either
self? Aspiring nonsmokers, for example, might seek help in the
form of taxes or bans on cigarettes, but how do we know how
high or extensive those restrictions should be?
Part I begins by comparing the revelation problems inherent
in government spending on public goods with those attached to
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interventions in the presence of negative externalities, and col-
lective action problems more generally.' The idea is to establish
a framework for evaluating the likelihood that internality-
driven interventions will be superior. Part II focuses on internal-
ity problems and suggests that, with information revelation in
the picture, the case for helmet laws is stronger than that for
more intensive smoking regulation or more forced savings. Part
III detours to make a novel argument for inheritance taxes. In
all these examples the strategy is to begin with a plausible case
for legal intervention and then focus on mechanisms for extract-
ing enough information about preferences to support some par-
ticular regulatory intensity. I suggest that while the literature
on mechanism design has succeeded in adding incentive-
compatibility questions to assessments of efficient resource allo-
cation,2 there is a third leg on which interventions must stand. It
is often important to think also about interest compatibility,
which is to say feasibility in a world of transaction costs and
competing interest groups. As this Article concludes, regulatory
aspirations must be incentive compatible, but they must also
take into account the political coalitions necessary for the en-
actment of intensity-determining rules. This political, or inter-
est-compatibility, factor is what makes the foundational ele-
ments of mechanism design difficult to cut and paste onto
concrete legal problems.
1 I do not mean to exhaust the list of government interventions that would benefit
from information revelation. I have previously tackled the problem of valuing assets, for
tax and other purposes, and also the extraction of information about preferences with
respect to government spending and local information about which taxpayers might have
better information than central planners. See generally Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed
Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va L Rev 771 (1982) (examining infor-
mation revelation through self-assessment for property taxes, tort damages, and ap-
praisal in corporate law); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U Chi L Rev 387 (1998)
(analyzing information-revelation mechanisms for campaign finance, foreign aid, and
nonprofit organizations). Indeed, my more recent work on plea bargaining, stipulated
damages, information markets, voting, and jury aggregation all contain elements of in-
formation revelation-as is true for many other authors' work-suggesting ubiquity, as
well as skepticism that any one approach to mechanism design will be useful throughout
law. The mechanism-design literature normally frames the issue in principal-agent
terms, so it may be useful to note that the present Article focuses on information a prin-
cipal (or the government on behalf of a set of its principals) seeks about the future self.
2 For an accessible overview, see Roger B. Myerson, Perspectives on Mechanism
Design in Economic Theory, 98 Am Econ Rev 586, 587-89 (2008).
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I. LEGAL INTERVENTION, WEAK REVELATION, AND COST-BENEFIT
It is hard to generalize about public goods and information
revelation because both labels include disparate problems.
3
There is agreement that nonrivalrous and nonexcludable goods
can be efficiently provided, but not by standard markets. In
principle, the government (itself a public good of size to be de-
termined) should produce or contract for the good in question up
to the point at which the marginal cost of the last unit is equal
to the sum of the prices that all consumers would pay for it. If
one additional unit of clean air or one more navy vessel can be
produced for one hundred and there are enough persons who
value additional clean air or national defense at one or two each
so that the sum of their reservation prices exceeds one hundred,
then the government should go ahead and supply this marginal
unit.
Many of the embedded analytic problems will be apparent
even to readers unfamiliar with the considerable literature. The
government has no ready access to information about citizens'
true valuations, and the respondents will probably have incen-
tives to overstate or understate their demands. Moreover, true
responses depend on after-tax income, but the government needs
to know the size of its public-goods investment before it an-
nounces tax burdens. Those tax burdens will then impose ineffi-
ciencies that ought to be taken into account in determining the
optimal level of public goods. In addition, there are few if any
pure public goods; expenditures on clean air and national de-
fense do not provide equal benefits to every part of a country
(and, as a further complication, individuals will migrate to cap-
ture benefits); even lighthouses 4 and television broadcasts can
exclude those who do not pay; and transaction costs may be low
enough to create groups and then markets for some nonrivalrous
goods.
If we simply ask individuals to describe their demand for
national defense (hoping to aggregate and, at the margin, compare
3 Even Wikipedia, attributing a remark to Steven Shavell, notes that the public-
goods label applies not to many things amenable to similar corrective solutions, but to
"an infinite series of particular problems (some of overproduction, some of underproduc-
tion, and so on), each with a particular solution that cannot be deduced from the theory,"
but that depend on facts and circumstances. Wikipedia, Public Good, online at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-good (visited Mar 2, 2014).
4 See generally R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J L & Econ 357
(1974).
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with marginal costs), we know that many will overreport, much
as they would overcrowd a commons. Others will strategically
underreport in order to influence the aggregation. If we control
for the overreporting problem by setting individual tax rates as
a function of this individually reported demand, underreporting
will be yet more of a problem. In some contexts, information can
be deduced by prices in other markets. A person with an expen-
sive air-filtration system at home has revealed something about
the value she attaches to clean air. But good clues are uncom-
mon, and they tell us more about market prices than the indi-
vidual's true valuation. Simple tricks do not help much. For ex-
ample, randomly alternating the two preceding strategies, and
announcing that a different tax base will be used to execute the
first strategy, is surely better than either strategy alone, but it
is likely to leave respondents over- or underreporting. Another
strategy is to ask many people about demand and then random-
ly select one response as law. Individuals might honestly report
(even though there is a tiny chance that any one response will be
selected) but then we need to extrapolate from that one response
to the community's aggregate demand. If we simply multiply by
the population, we will be far off the mark unless we are re-
markably lucky with our random choice. If we borrow from game
theory and offer a mixed strategy of aggregation and individual
selection, we get less honest revelation and inadequate aggrega-
tion. We might also offer an assurance contract for a set of as-
sets, encouraging each respondent to pledge according to his
preferences (with money returned if the goal is unmet), but this
works better when we are sure of the overall investment (or in-
tensity of the intervention, as I have been calling it) in the first
place.6
By default, perhaps, we normally ask the median elected
representative, with reasonably full knowledge of tax methods
and burdens, to decide on the aggregate expenditure. The sys-
tem is responsive to interest groups and thus perhaps to intense
preferences, and it is fairly path dependent; expenditures and
commitments have impact well beyond election cycles.
In other settings, the legal system faces comparable infor-
mation problems and reacts by delegating authority to agencies,
5 See generally Alexander Tabarrok, The Private Provision of Public Goods via
Dominant Assurance Contracts, 96 Pub Choice 345 (1998) (describing a scheme in which
beneficiaries make voluntary contributions to a public good and receive money back plus
a premium if the stated goal required for the good is unmet).
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subject to some democratic oversight. The problem is framed as
one of cost-benefit analysis but it is not much different from the
national-defense scenario. One can gather cost information
about various methods (and intensities) of pollution abatement,
for example, but then we wish we knew the tradeoffs or prefer-
ences of the population with respect to costs and benefits. Again,
individuals who do not expect to pay for abatement have reason
to exaggerate the value of a cleaner environment. Here cost-
benefit analysis camouflages the role of the median voter. When
an agency values lives saved or hours expended, it uses an aver-
age valuation or derives the values from market data such that
an average or marginal participant's behavior is the lodestar.6 It
must then multiply that lodestar by the number of people bene-
fited or burdened. Again, therefore, it seems too difficult to ag-
gregate across heterogeneous individuals in order to provide the
right level of the public good. Put differently, law reflects an as-
sumption that the distribution of valuations is symmetrical
around the lodestar. Note in passing that it may be just as well
if this lodestar is the median person; if not, the political solution
in terms of the median voter will always be at odds with the
agency determination, and there will be pressure to relocate de-
cision making. On the other hand, the agency is likely to be bet-
ter than the median voter-representative, or veto-equipped pres-
ident, when it comes to taking future generations' interests into
account. None is free of the temptation to burden future genera-
tions with debt.
It becomes apparent that one can be fairly sure that the
government should be in the business of national defense or
clean air without having any confidence in recommending the
intensity of this intervention. There is no reason to think that
nonintervention would be superior, although a superficial inter-
est-group analysis might suggest that there is too much military
spending and too little environmental law (because of the pref-
erences advanced by easily organized interest groups). For pre-
sent purposes, the point is simply to see that it is difficult to get
the intensity of a legal intervention right. This difficulty provides
6 An interesting problem is that the use of market information about such things
as wage premiums in high-risk jobs, used to assess value of life for cost-benefit analyses,
reveals information about the marginal worker. It would seem that the average worker
should produce the number to be multiplied. For an emphasis on average risk tolerance,
see generally W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Criti-
cal Review of Market Estimates throughout the World, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 5 (2003).
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a perspective with which to evaluate proposed interventions in
other settings.
II. INTERNALITIES AND REVELATION
A. Helmet Laws and Collective Action
If helmet laws were legislated to control externalities, a
lawmaker would, ideally, induce information revelation in order
to determine the activities or conditions requiring helmets, as
well as the quality (expense) of helmets required. The conscien-
tious regulator would want to know individuals' preferences, in-
cluding discomfort or other costs of wearing helmets, as well as
benefits expected from increased safety. Individuals are likely to
be heterogeneous with respect to benefits and costs.
But consider the possibility that helmet laws (or contractual
requirements) are driven by internalities. A skier, for example,
may recognize the safety value of a helmet but decline to acquire
one because it will look uncool. Perhaps it will signal a lack of
daring, or disrupt a desired apr~s-ski hairstyle. If many skiers
feel this way, they can be made better off if a third party, or law
effected by secret ballot, requires helmets. So long as a critical
mass dons protection, the negative signal will disappear. In
turn, the third party might be an entrepreneur (the ski area) or
the government, aiming to satisfy these constituents.V This gov-
ernment intervention in the face of a collective action problem is
relatively easy to bring about, because no interest group will op-
pose the regulation sought by, or on behalf of, the aspiring hel-
met wearers.
The helmet example, which might just as well have been
about bicyclists, motorcyclists, or hockey players,8 is especially
interesting because the government must decide very little in
the way of regulatory intensity. If, for example, a jurisdiction re-
quires helmets for motorbikes, it can allow riders to decide
7 It is an internality because the skier wants help with self-control. There is also
an externality involved in the sense that the skier wants to subsidize or otherwise en-
courage others to wear helmets, because their behavior casts an external benefit on the
skier.
8 See Thomas C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight
Saving: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities, 17 J Conflict Resol 381, 381 (1973):
One player summed up the feelings of many: "It's foolish not to wear a helmet.
But I don't-because the other guys don't. I know that'[s] silly, but most of the
players feel the same way. If the league made us do it, though, we'd all wear
them and nobody would mind."
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whether to buy and wear inexpensive helmets, offering little
protection, or more substantial helmets. There is a cost imposed
on those who really do not want to wear any helmet, and who
know their future selves well, but who lose out to the interest
group in favor of helmets. It is thus noteworthy that with a low
level of enforcement, the government can accommodate this
group reasonably well. It needs just enough enforcement to over-
come the collective action or internality problem faced by many
skiers or riders; indeed, once helmet wearing becomes common,
the law can tolerate people who really prefer not to wear a hel-
met. It is plausible that this describes the state of affairs in most
jurisdictions that mandate helmets.
In sum, if we think of helmet laws as imposed not because of
paternalism or externalities, but rather as examples of self-help,
then it is a small leap to the conclusion that legal intervention in
the form of a modest mandate enables revelation, which is to say
self-revelation. Some helmet wearers might have known all
along that they preferred helmets (though not enough to over-
come the collective action problem of unfashionability or peer
pressure) while others might learn about their own preferences
only when the collective action problem is cleared away. In turn,
the government does not need to decide on a single kind of hel-
met in the face of heterogeneity. By setting a minimum re-
quirement it can free individuals to determine the sort of helmet
they wish to don. In turn, the difficult problems associated with
determining the current intensity of regulation, discussed in
Part I, largely disappear because individuals self-regulate in
part and the government does not seek to assess the proper in-
tensity for the median voter.
B. Smoking and Regulatory Intensity
I have argued elsewhere that cigarette taxes can be under-
stood as enacted on behalf of aspiring nonsmokers in search of
internality control.9 These aspirants likely require an alliance
with other groups, including perhaps persons who expect to ben-
efit from cigarette taxes, who fear that they will bear a dispro-
portionate share of future health-care costs imposed by smokers,
or who have a disproportionate interest in selective smoking
9 See Saul Levmore, Internality Regulation through Public Choice, 15 Theoretical
Inquiries L *2 (forthcoming 2014), online at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default
/ffes/microsites/polcing-ltigation-conferencel es/Interalities%20background%20paper%2Ofor
%20Columbia_0.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014).
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bans in addition to taxes. A political entrepreneur might facili-
tate the unstated alliance. For the purposes of the present Arti-
cle the question is whether either part of this theory-
internality or public choice---casts positive or normative light on
the intensity, or extent, of smoking bans or taxes. Plausible ex
post (perhaps even just-so) stories are easy to construct. For ex-
ample, if cigarette taxes developed as described, then we might
"explain" increases in intensity of regulation from the perspec-
tive of two critical interest groups. Aspiring nonsmokers them-
selves will have started with low taxes and limited bans in order
not to arouse more opposition than necessary. When the re-
strictions that are enacted cause some but not all to cease smok-
ing, continuing but still-aspiring nonsmokers might work harder
for more dramatic incentives. Meanwhile, some commercial in-
terests that opposed smoking bans but lost in the earlier round
will now be more likely to favor the extension of bans to their
competitors in order to eliminate any competitive disadvantage.
The argument assumes that taxes and bans are difficult to
withdraw once enacted. For example, if smoking was first
banned in restaurants, restaurateurs might join with aspiring
nonsmokers to extend the ban to bars. The smokers have, per-
haps, revealed to themselves and to the government that the
first-level tax did not do the job. They might now work harder or
trade something else for a higher tax. Meanwhile, restaurateurs,
the commercial interest injured by the first-round tax, will be
eager to extend the ban to competing businesses that are not yet
burdened by law.10 The process can be expected to continue until
opposition from nonaspiring smokers and commercial interests
is too strong for the next level of intensity. In the case of smok-
ing bans, the divide-and-conquer, or incremental, strategy,
alongside that of self-revelation, may not stop until smoking is
banned in all commercial establishments, in transportation fa-
cilities where smokers could be effectively segregated, and even
in many outdoor locations. The intensity of regulation fits much
better with the internality perspective than it does with an ex-
ternality-driven view.
Note that even if (as assumed here) many an aspirant
knows best the intensity of the tax that would cause him or her
to quit, aggregating or averaging these pieces of information
10 The process is explored in Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with
Incrementalism, 158 U Pa L Rev 815, 838 (2010).
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accomplishes little. Moreover, the higher the tax, the more it
will be opposed by continuing smokers and other interests. As-
piring nonsmokers will not therefore start out pushing for an in-
tense set of taxes and bans because this will arouse more opposi-
tion than necessary. Moreover, other aspirants do not know
what intensity they require and they might look to discover in-
formation about themselves. Similarly, the information does not
permit tax differentials, whether linked to individualized infor-
mation or age groups (higher taxes on young smokers than el-
derly smokers seems right), because arbitrage is too easy. This
perspective on antismoking regulation says a great deal about
interest group formation and internality control, but only a
modest amount about information revelation. This is because it
is most plausible to think of aspiring nonsmokers as wishing to
quit but being uncertain, or even heterogeneous, about the in-
centives required to bring this about, and with what probability.
Unlike pollution or saving for the future, for which there is like-
ly heterogeneity about tradeoffs and therefore desired outcomes,
we imagine most aspirants as simply wishing to quit smoking
entirely. They explore the power of interest group opposition,
but neither they nor any regulators need to obtain much infor-
mation about themselves. At most, we might add some paternal-
ism to the picture and say that regulators wish to take into ac-
count health effects of smoking but also its utility to the smokers
themselves. The regulators do not know how much smokers wish
to quit and how painful it is for continuing smokers to bear the
cost of smoking outside of buildings and other nonsmoking ha-
vens. In turn, the regulators ratchet up the taxes and bans in
order to learn about these benefits and costs, and they do so by
observing interest group support and opposition. Either way, lit-
tle would have been gained by knowing the equilibrium point at
the outset.
If we focus on only those aspirants who think they know the
size of the tax or other regulation that would cause them to quit,
there is again no obvious regulatory strategy to pursue on behalf
of these smokers. Imagine that in their strong moments these
smokers would reveal their quitting prices. If each smoker could
then employ a regulator to monitor the future self, and to pre-
vent arbitrage, it would be obvious how to proceed; there would
be individualized taxes on cigarettes or rewards for quitting. But
inasmuch as, in reality, the future self is capable of evading de-
tection, the best the aspirant can do is encourage taxes and other
2014]
The University of Chicago Law Review
incentives that will fall on all smokers equally." The single in-
put makes these taxes easy to administer, but the detection
problem makes customization-and therefore information reve-
lation-of theoretical rather than practical interest.
In contrast, I turn now to an example of internality control
that presents more pragmatic information problems, similar to
those associated with many public goods and negative externali-
ties, as sketched in Part I, but again without the need to deter-
mine the median voter's costs and benefits.
C. Saving for the Future Self
1. Private savings.
Behavioral economics has stressed default rules and other
means of nudging people to save more. 12 But how do we know
that more savings are really what people want and, if they do,
how will we know how much more? Framing surely matters in
evaluating both words and actions, but we do not know which
frame reveals "true" preferences. It is in high-income savers' in-
terest to force or encourage others to save because impoverished
elderly persons are likely to have political power or to generate
sympathy and then to bring about higher taxes on others and
redistribution in favor of this group. Several generations of in-
creasing social security benefits are testament to this perspec-
tive, though current earners might well receive less in benefits
than they paid in taxes (plus interest). Savers are often stunned
by the failure of others, and even similarly situated others, to
save, but it is possible that the failure to save is like the decision
to live in a flood zone without insurance; as long as enough peo-
ple partake in the moral hazard, it is likely that they will elicit
sympathy and develop sufficient political power to induce relief
11 It is interesting that bans, as opposed to taxes, can be tailored to subgroup pref-
erences, as they sometimes were in workplaces before the incrementalism process rolled
along.
12 See John Beshears, et al, The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Sav-
ing Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in Jeffrey Brown, Jeffrey Liebman, and
David A. Wise, eds, Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment 167, 187 (Chicago
2009). Evidence of savings behavior also provides clues. Thus, married couples save con-
siderably more than cohabiting couples, and much more than people who live alone. On
diversification and other grounds this may seem surprising. It is tempting to ascribe this
behavior to teamwork, in accord with the discussion of weight-loss programs, and in both
cases the driving force may simply be the likelihood that there is open discussion about
the aspiration. The discussion in the text sets these design issues aside in order to devel-
op ideas about information revelation.
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when things go wrong. If so, social security and tax preferences
for savings (up to some level) are easily understood as attempts
by one group to control the moral hazard practiced by another.
Ex ante, we can describe citizens as looking to solve an internal-
ity problem, but once they have sorted into savers and nonsav-
ers, the former group tries to influence the latter, while the lat-
ter might resist in order to benefit from redistribution later on.
Either way, the puzzle is that the encouragement and the
mandate are not stronger. It is projected that millions of people
will be "forced" into a lower standard of living after retirement
(even where it is voluntary, as under US law). Savings can
therefore be understood or at least entertained as an internality
problem. One problem, if not solution to the puzzle, is that non-
savers do not know how much they have in common with one
another. The intensity of regulation to undertake on their behalf
is not obvious. Many smokers want to quit entirely, but aspiring
savers are more heterogeneous.
The most obvious strategy is to ask people how much they
wish to save, and perhaps even to extract contracts or votes at
their strong moments. One small problem is that respondents
may differ in their treatment of home equity and their assess-
ments of future social security and health-care benefits. A more
serious problem with this approach is that an overwhelming ma-
jority of respondents say they ought to save more, and yet their
contemporaneous actions are at odds with their responses. 13 It is
conventional, at least for economists, to insist that people's ac-
tions speak louder than their words, though this of course as-
sumes away the internality problem. In any event, there is an
obvious information-revelation issue; a large majority says it
wishes to increase savings, but neither that majority nor any
government acting as its intermediary knows how much more
individuals wish to save. Regulatory intensity depends on unre-
vealed information.
It is possible to collect information from people who resem-
ble the future selves, or beneficiaries. We might ask retired peo-
ple in their seventies how much, in absolute or percentage
13 See B. Douglas Bernheim, Do Households Appreciate Their Financial Vulnerabil-
ities? An Analysis of Actions, Perceptions, and Public Policy, in Tax Policy and Economic
Growth 3, 11-13 (ACCF Center for Policy Research 1995). See also George-Marios An-
geletos, et al, The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empiri-
cal Evaluation, 15 J Econ Persp 47, 47 (Summer 2001) ("A 1997 survey found that 76
percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement.").
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terms, they wish they had saved in their thirties and forties. The
responses might be too high, inasmuch as the consumption en-
joyed earlier in life will now seem distant and abstract. 14 We
might try to ask more specifically about the tradeoff engaged in
many years earlier between savings and home buying, for ex-
ample. If a great majority of seventy-year-olds say they wish
they had lived in smaller houses and had saved more, that
might seem relevant to the decisions made by, or on behalf of,
current thirty-year-olds. The strategy is weakly analogous to an
internality-driven view of speed limits or driving ages, or even
personal bankruptcy. Few drivers are pleased when caught
speeding, and it is the rare fourteen-year-old who agrees that
she or he should be denied the right to drive, even though these
regulatory interventions likely reduce danger to future selves.
But many drivers would want speed limits and minimum-age
requirements to control their own children, even though they
value their children's time and pleasure. We can think of these
restrictions as internality as well as externality controls, and
when the former are concerned it might be more useful to rely
on parents as proxies for future selves and as a check on over-
optimism or other self-control issues. Speed limits and bank-
ruptcy laws (like cigarette taxes) cannot easily be customized,
even though one's proxy has particular information, but forced
savings can be individualized. 15 One can barely imagine a primi-
tive information-revelation scheme, in which parents determine
the forced savings (and conditions of withdrawal) applicable to
their children. We might disallow withdrawals for the benefit of
these fiduciaries.
There are obvious drawbacks to asking an older generation
to decide the intensity of regulations applied to the next genera-
tion. There may be hindsight bias depending on one's circum-
stances. These circumstances are in turn the product of govern-
ment programs that might themselves have evolved differently
if people had saved more (or behaved differently along other di-
mensions). External factors, including technological change, may
depreciate the value of information obtained from an earlier
generation. Indeed, there may be settings in which Generation
14 If responses are biased by ex post justification, then we will hear little regret.
15 In the case of bankruptcy law, there is an externality on one's intimates and
business associates but also an internality related to savings, risk taking, and the future
self. In any event, different individuals in their strong moments would want different
discharge (and other) rules.
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II's future selves are best revealed and regulated not by the
preferences or judgment of their elders in Generation I, but by
the predictions of their tech-savvy offspring in Generation III.
For some nonsavers, there may be a collective action prob-
lem of the helmet kind. People may consume rather than save in
order to keep up with their peer group. The problem may be one
of appearances, of group pressure, or of interdependent utility. X
spends on food, drink, and boats because Y and Z do so; if all
saved more and consumed less, X would enjoy low-cost activities
with these friends and might later on enjoy traveling with them
during their retirement years. Again, government intervention
might elicit X's true preferences, with the added idea that the
regulation might enable X, Y, and Z to reveal their preferences
to one another.
Intervention might therefore aim to force (or encourage) in-
dividuals to learn about their future selves, as well as the pref-
erences of their peers. Imagine that government required, or
made irresistible, a higher savings rate for all persons between
ages thirty and thirty-two. At that point the rate would rise, and
after another two years increase again. During these experi-
mental years, the forced saver would receive information show-
ing how the forced rates would accumulate savings over the next
thirty years if they were voluntarily continued. At the end of the
entire experimental period, each person could choose a future
savings rate, ranging from the level associated with social secu-
rity (or perhaps lower) to the highest level experienced during
the last period of experimentation. The idea is that people might
discover that savings reduces stress, that they can indeed live
without constantly consuming more than they earn, or simply
that friendship need not be an arms race. 16 We might prefer to
call this "learning" rather than information revelation, but in-
asmuch as one is likely to learn about interdependent utility and
16 Conventional wisdom is that people who expect to live longer save more. Allow-
ance is made for the confounding factor of illness on both savings and mortality. Unrec-
ognized, apparently, is that the causation can go in the opposite direction. Savings might
reduce stress, and stress might cause health problems and contribute to mortality. This
is the driving force behind controversial and contested claims about inequality and good
social outcomes for all. See generally Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit
Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better (Allen Lane 2009). In turn,
forced savings might extend lives.
Note that the experiment is truer to the preceding discussion if friends are of the
same age; ideally X, Y, and Z will experience forced savings and reduced consumption at
the same time. This is a reason to force savings at a younger age.
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the preferences of others, the two labels seem jointly appropri-
ate.
Forced self-revelation with respect to savings raises two
questions, constituting threats to any internality-driven savings
plan. The first is that the future self can undo the precommit-
ting, or forced, earlier selfs decisions by borrowing. Someone
who agrees in a strong moment--or following the experimental
periods suggested here-to save more can, in weak moments,
use credit cards and other devices to undo this savings. We
might expect more substitution of this kind when the savings is
forced than when it is merely nudged, though there is scant evi-
dence for this intuition.17 Fortunately, most lenders require col-
lateral to make substantial loans, and then make other loans for
only relatively short periods of time. Education loans are excep-
tional, but these are not normally forgiven in personal bank-
ruptcy.'8 A more complete and dramatic experiment would teach
individuals and peer groups about their contingent preferences
by putting them through experimental periods with different
ceilings on uncollateralized debt. Two years without credit cards
might provide valuable information about one's alternative, fu-
ture selves. Credit card issuers would need to require evidence
of an applicant's age and would then know to check a data bank
in order not to permit borrowing beyond the specified ceiling.
There are reasons to coordinate this self-revelation regarding
borrowing with that regarding savings, but some mixing and
matching is possible. Individuals who learned that they wanted
restrictions on future borrowing would need the government's
help in enforcing these restrictions on their future selves, and
thus on lenders. It is somehow easier to imagine self-revealing
17 Compare Shlomo Bernartzi and Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics and
the Retirement Savings Crisis, 339 Science 1152, 1152-53 (2013) (calculating that em-
ployees who participated in the "Save More Tomorrow" retirement-savings plan, which
committed them to gradually escalating savings rates, boosted annual savings by $7.4
billion), with Raj Chetty, et al, Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowdout in Retirement
Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark *42-43 (NBER Working Paper No 18,565
Nov 2012), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18565 (visited Mar 2, 2014) (pointing
to a study showing that when employees are automatically enrolled into a retirement-
savings plan, 85 percent of employees save more rather than just shifting assets from
other accounts).
18 See John A.E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal
Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 Can Bus L J 245, 246 (2006), citing
11 USC § 523(a)(8). For a description of the limited cases in which education loans may
be discharged in bankruptcy, see Federal Student Aid, Forgiveness, Cancellation, and
Discharge (US Department of Education), online at http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans
/forgiveness-cancellation#discharge-in (visited Mar 2, 2014).
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individuals committing to future savings than to future re-
strictions on borrowing; savings plans may be for thirty years,
but borrowing restrictions will likely be politically palatable only
if they are of shorter duration. In any event, internality-driven
borrowing restrictions require significantly more law than do
forced-savings plans, though they are necessary only to the ex-
tent that forced savers will indeed borrow to offset their savings.
Internality control with respect to borrowing, rather than
net savings more generally, might be driven by the familiar col-
lective action problem of positional goods, which might not be
limited to keeping up with one's friends. 19 Everyone cannot have
the nicest car on the block, and the quest for position is waste-
ful. One way to slow the arms race is to tax luxury goods, and
another is to restrict borrowing. These interventions risk impos-
ing severe inefficiencies, but the point is that they might do far
more good than harm. Again, law might be seen as prepared to
intervene on behalf of those who fear the arms race, though the
proper intensity of such an intervention is difficult to discern.
Periods of forced experimentation, once one has the means to
spend, might be a good way to get at the collective action prob-
lem without imposing enormous efficiency costs. The positional-
goods perspective must not be oversold; those who save might
simply spend more in the future on positional goods, so that
forced savings simply encourages a tradeoff between an arms
race now and another, equally wasteful one, in the future.
The second point returns us to the potential collective action
problem among nonsavers, who may plan on being rescued by
savers or by a younger generation, perhaps through increased
social security benefits. From an ex ante perspective this, too, is
an internality problem, as the obvious but elusive solution is a
credible commitment by the government not to raise social secu-
rity benefits in the future. Of course, the more citizens sign on to
forced-savings plans, the more formidable the interest group
that will likely oppose rescuing nonsavers in the future.20 As
such, internality-driven savings plans have some promise-even
19 See Albert 0. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Ac-
tion 27-32 (Princeton 1982); Robert H. Frank, Falling Behind: How Income Inequality
Harms the Middle Class 61-77 (Berkeley 2007).
20 Similarly, if the number of people allowed to live uninsured in flood zones can be
decreased, it becomes more likely that flood relief will be denied later on to those who
overbuilt and were uninsured, simply because their interest group will be smaller, and
those who paid for insurance will resent payments to the uninsured. In turn, yet fewer
people will risk the moral hazard.
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if they are weakened by the ability of the future self to borrow as
well as to extract payments from those who have saved and are
in a position to redistribute.
2. Public deficits.
From a public-choice perspective, the notion that individual
savings and borrowing reflect a problem of self-control will seem
of minor significance compared to the political failures associat-
ed with public spending and borrowing decisions. Organized in-
terest groups are understood to push for expenditures that bene-
fit them and to do so at the expense of widely dispersed
taxpayers who are less likely to organize in opposition. The best
strategy for a group that wants a particular public expenditure
is to see that it is financed with borrowing; the losers are then
not only dispersed but also unidentifiable, inasmuch as it is un-
clear who will bear the future tax burden associated with deficit
spending.
There is much more that could be said about this phenome-
non, but inasmuch as the aim here is to explore the interaction
between information revelation and internalities-and there is
little reason to think that the central problem is missing infor-
mation about how citizens view deficit spending-I simply note
that deficit financing can also be understood as an internality
and collective action problem. If taxpayers could all cease form-
ing interest groups that pushed costs onto the vulnerable future,
they might all be better off. At the state and local levels, there
are forces that bring on balanced-budget requirements, but
these strategies for self-control and interest-rate reductions are
easily circumvented.21 The problem is not so different from that
faced by the individual contemplating his or her future self with
inadequate savings, and the problem of intensity seems less crit-
ical. There is less need to know each taxpayer's preference about
the tradeoff between current spending and future repayment.
3. Supermajority requirements for internality controls.
The legislated reactions to many of these internality prob-
lems have a common antilibertarian feature. If, for example,
young citizens are forced to save more, even for an experimental
21 See D. Roderick Kiewiet and Kristin Szakaly, Constitutional Limitations on Bor-




period, some citizens will be unambiguously worse off. If helmets
are required, there will be some riders and skiers who really do
not want to wear them, and for reasons unrelated to the collec-
tive action problem affecting others. A majority or organized
group may bring about self-help legislation, but it is also likely
to impose burdens on similarly situated persons who do not
share in the aspirations of the influential group. Nor are the
burdens simply wealth transfers. Cigarette taxes may force out
smokers who do not wish to quit; helmet requirements may im-
pose on the liberty of those who want to feel the wind blow; and
forced savings will restrict the freedom of persons who really
want to spend now and be frugal later. Whenever law favors as-
sisted self-control, the winners impose costs on the losers. This
episodic tyranny of the majority can also be thought of as a col-
lective action problem.
A partial remedy, or compromise, is to require a superma-
jority vote for an intervention that is more about an internality
than a public good or externality. For example, a forced-savings
plan that was voluntary (but then binding on the future self)
would require a simple majority vote, but one that was imposed
on an entire group might require a three-fifths vote in the enact-
ing legislature. Such a supermajority vote guarantees nothing,
but makes it more likely that aggregate benefits exceed aggre-
gate costs. More important, the requirement would encourage
the majority to work harder at developing voluntary rather than
coercive plans.
Something of this kind is at work in local government law
under which borrowing sometimes required a referendum with a
supermajority requirement; a more effective brake seems to be a
debt limit framed as a percent of the local property tax base.22
Fifteen states require a supermajority to increase taxes.23 At the
federal level, there is a modern history of supermajority votes
starting with the House's adopting a rule requiring a three-
fifths vote for tax-rate increases.24 The similarity highlights the
22 See Paul G. Farnham, Re-examining Local Debt Limits: A Disaggregated Analy-
sis, 51 S Econ J 1186, 1195-96 (1985).
23 See Laura Tomaka, Which States Require Supermajority Votes in the Legislature
to Pass Tax Increases? (CSG Midwest March 2011), online at http://www.csgmidwest.org
/member_servicestMarch20llqom.aspx (visited Mar 2, 2014). But see League of Educa-
tion Voters v Washington, 295 P3d 743, 753 (Wash 2013) (striking down Washington's
supermajority provision).
24 Rule XXI(5)(c), Rules of the House of Representatives, 105th Congress (GPO Oct
7, 1997), online at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/HMAN-105/pdf/HMAN-105-pg654.pdf
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relationship between deficit spending at the governmental level
and inadequate saving, as well as other internality problems, at
the individual level. In all these cases, the proffered solution is
suggestive rather than convincing because categories are malle-
able and avoidance techniques by a determined, simple majority
are numerous. As before, I do not dwell on this proposed solution
because the focus here is on the relationship between internality
control and information revelation.
III. INHERITANCE TAXES
Warren Buffett is not the only wealthy person who claims
that he should be taxed at a higher rate, whether in life or at
death or both.2s But most people, perhaps Buffett included, try to
reduce their taxes, because they prefer to leave money to heirs,
to allocate resources to other beneficiaries including tax-
preferred organizations, or to consume more in their lifetimes.
With the right deductions, exemptions, and rates, we might ex-
pect most wealthy persons to be indifferent between income tax-
es and death taxes. Once limitations or progressive taxes on
consumption are included, and there is integration of bequests
and inter vivos gifts for tax purposes, income taxes and death
taxes become substitutes; they can be seen as different forms of
wealth taxation. Indeed, with sufficient polishing, a consump-
tion-centered tax can also be interchangeable with forms of in-
come and death taxes.
It is plausible that there are people who seek the govern-
ment's help in declining to leave fortunes to their offspring. They
prefer, within limits, to encourage their descendants to make
their way on their own, but they face pressure from family
members, or perhaps from their future selves, not to give their
wealth to outsiders. The problem for these people is that their
preferences or behavior depends on that of others. Here, as with
helmets and savings, law can help people reveal and act upon
their true preferences. A high inheritance tax might cause fami-
ly members to be less averse to the testator's transfers outside
(visited Mar 2, 2014), as amended by H Res 5, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong Rec 121
(Jan 7, 1997).
25 See, for example, Warren Buffett, A Minimum Tax on the Wealthy, NY Times
A27 (Nov 26, 2012); Peter J. Reilly, Warren Buffett and George Soros Want Higher Estate
Tax than Obama Proposes (Forbes Dec 11, 2012), online at http://www.forbes.com
/sitespeterjreilly2012/12/1 1/warren-buffett-and-george-soros-want-higher-estate-tax-than
-obama-proposes (visited Mar 3, 2014).
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the family. If W wants to control his wealth, and wishes, even if
only at strong moments, to give much of it away to selected
causes, then W will incur lower costs (with his future self and)
within his own family if transfers to them would be taxed heavi-
ly. People like W might therefore openly or quietly prefer higher
inheritance taxes, especially if their income or consumption tax
rates will drop as a result.26
W's likely heirs might, correspondingly, prefer lower death
taxes, unless they expect the concomitant higher income taxes to
decrease W's work effort enough to offset the direct benefit to
them from lower death taxes. High exemptions in the estate tax
can be seen as devices to buy off the voters, or heirs, who would
otherwise choose a different balance than would their elders.
The volatility we experience as between income and estate tax
rates might reflect the difficulty of building a stable coalition
among subsets of donors and heirs-not to mention charitable
organizations with their own preferences regarding the two tax-
es' rates. In some cases, heirs might perceive that they too
should be indifferent between the two taxes, with revenue held
neutral. A higher income tax will leave less wealth subject to the
lower death tax, and so forth. But in other cases, the heirs are
likely to know more about the testator's habits, work, and chari-
table impulses, and it is easy to think that a subgroup, or major-
ity, of heirs will much prefer a lower inheritance tax. At the very
least, a risk-averse testator who is uncertain about his or her
longevity, and skeptical of annuity markets, will prefer to pre-
serve assets and will be dissuaded from doing so only by a high
death tax.
A fanciful idea in the spirit of optimal taxation is to allow
every wealthy individual, at age sixty for example, to choose
among revenue-neutral combinations of income and estate tax
rates. The goal is to capture not only more work effort from
those who know they will work more if marginal income tax
26 Inasmuch as the focus here is on the collective action problem, I set aside the
mystery of people caring (or not caring) about what happens after death. See Ariel Porat
and Avraham Tabbach, Willingness to Pay, Death, Wealth, and Damages, 13 Am L &
Econ Rev 45, 52-60 (2011). I do, however, imagine that a low income tax, high inher-
itance tax regime would do something to keep people from consuming everything in their
lifetimes in order to avoid taxation. For most people, the need to forgo consumption
should be seen as a kind of tax. Note also that the idea in the text can be useful, because
of its opt-in character, even if the estate tax more generally has a small impact on chari-
table giving. See David Joulfaian, Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests: Evidence from
Two Tax Regimes (Office of Tax Analysis Mar 2005), online at http://www.treasury.gov
/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysisIDocuments/ota 9 2 .pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014).
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rates are lower, but also more gifts to charitable organizations
from those less inclined to leave fortunes to their heirs. The idea
is that while heirs might prefer lower estate taxes (and therefore
higher income taxes), some of their elders might prefer a higher
price on transmitting wealth to heirs. These donors want a
higher estate tax (and lower income tax) even though others in
their position, as well as their heirs, do not. The government can
be understood as an indifferent intermediary, but it is more in-
teresting to think of it as preferring charitable gifts inasmuch as
these can serve as efficient means of allocating resources among
organizations, or agents, that the government wishes to sup-
port. 27 I leave for another day the question of whether it is possi-
ble to structure a workable check-the-box system, and whether
the payoff is worth the effort of doing so. For now it is useful to
see that law might again, as with helmets, allow persons to act
upon, and in a sense reveal, their true preferences. The relative-
ly high inheritance tax preferred by people like W may survive
the opposition of contrary interests because it is not designed
around a median voter but rather for those who opt in to it. In-
terest group opposition is avoided, and welfare likely enhanced,
if law can be customized in this way. Note that the choice must
be irreversible, or perhaps costly to reverse, or heirs will have
many opportunities to get their way.
It is possible that lobbying effort by charities is something of
a proxy for the preferences and expected behavior of donors. The
intensity of universities' or museums' reactions to the prospect
of changes in income and inheritance taxes might be a useful
way of judging the likely reactions of donors to different tax
rates. The interest group is self-serving, of course, but if we
think of donations to charities as undertaken by relatively well-
informed persons, whose tax-influenced behavior is like a ballot,
then we might welcome the tax laws that charities favor, at
least with respect to the balance between income and inher-
itance taxes. The not-for-profits' perspective can be understood
as a subtle product of information revelation, though not one
that leads to customization of law.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to overstate the link between information revela-
tion and government intervention. I began by emphasizing that
27 See Levmore, 65 U Chi L Rev at 404-08 (cited in note 1).
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decisions about regulatory intensity require the extraction of
private information and advanced the idea that some regulatory
schemes can enable individuals to self-reveal and customize
their (self-) regulation.
Even when the scope of inquiry is narrowed to laws that can
be understood as driven by internalities, information-revelation
problems seem more disparate than alike. Self-assessment
strategies work when there is little coercion and moral hazard.
In most cases, however, it is hard enough to discover the prefer-
ences of one's own future self, and so much more difficult to dis-
cover another's. I have suggested that there may be some areas,
like savings, in which moderately coercive experiments could re-
veal useful information about oneself and one's peers. But such
experiments, and mechanism design more generally, need to be
sensitive to the political coalitions that make regulatory inter-
vention possible.

